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In this paper, I would like to provide some of the elements necessary for a 
comprehension of Michel Henry’s position within the context of the 
phenomenological debate on inter-subjectivity. This apparently straightforward 
task is, in reality, extremely difficult. 
The grandeur of all great thinkers lies in the fact that they speak not of 
themselves or in their own names, but rather engage with ‘the things themselves.’ 
However, it is not at all clear whether and how it is possible to solicit and to 
establish a comparison between thinkers regarding such ‘things themselves.’ This 
difficulty is certainly present in the case under investigation since, strictly 
speaking, the expression ‘inter-subjectivity’ refers only to Husserl's formulation of 
the issue, which all the major interlocutors in the phenomenological debate on this 
topic have explicitly criticized, rejected and variously replaced. The alleged ‘thing 
itself’ therefore immediately bursts into a difficult-to-manage plurality of all the 
ways the thing in question has been named over time: “Fremdwahrnehmung,” 
“Mitsein,” “un-pour-l’autre” and “pathos-avec” are only some of the expressions 
Scheler, Heidegger, Levinas and Henry have used to reconfigure and rename the 
problem that Husserl’s phenomenology left as a legacy. These different 
expressions not only involve different historical-natural idioms, but also entirely 
different theoretical languages that, importantly, are not immediately translatable 
one into the other, and may indeed be mutually incompatible. In this respect, and 
clearly, the problem of ‘inter-subjectivity’—I use the expression here in an entirely 
provisional and general sense—has already emerged in all of its theoretical 
urgency. 
It may be noted, in beginning, that Henry lucidly and ruthlessly pointed 
out the difficulty that I have just briefly outlined, by stressing more than any other 
thinker before him the radically immanent character of this phenomenon: this—
                                                
1 The following article is a translation of a contribution offered originally to the international 
conference of the Fonds Michel Henry at Louvain and the ‘Istituto Italiano di Cultura’ at Bruxelles, 
entitled Michel Henry en résonance. Réceptions italiennes et débats actuels (Louvain-la-
Neuve/Bruxelles, 26-27 February 2015). 
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the very condition determining the possibility of accessing the things themselves—
takes place as the self-revelation of life to itself in pure self-affection. What can a 
form of inter-subjectivity—i.e., engagement, sharing, or community—mean, then, 
if it has nothing to do with objects or things, but is located at the original level of 
this self-revelation in immanence? 
It bears repeating that my aim here is not to discuss directly Henry’s 
perspective on inter-subjectivity, which, moreover, has already been addressed by 
a large body of literature.2 Rather, I seek to organize the phenomenological space 
in which Henry’s theoretical proposal should properly be located. This space I 
would define according to coordinates represented by the following basic 
theoretical options: a) the option that founds inter-subjectivity in an opening that 
is rooted a priori in the point of view that receives the manifestation of the 
phenomenon; b) the option that, conversely, frames this encounter with the other 
as structurally a posteriori, as an event whose possibility is not always already 
inscribed in the transcendental capacity of the point of view itself. The generic 
term ‘point of view’ is intended formally with respect to the multiplicity of ways 
in which it is instantiated in various phenomenological contexts. The principle 
according to which there can be no manifestation unless it is received and collected 
within such a specific point of view, whether this is termed transcendental 
consciousness, Dasein, ipséité, adonné or still another term, the ‘point of view’ is 
the space in which the phenomenological gaze is rooted and is that in relation to 
which the other is indeed an ‘other,’ a second and distinct point of view. 
The pair a priori-a posteriori establishes two clearly distinct models for 
the phenomenological constitution of the relation between these points of view. 
We cannot, of course, reasonably expect to find these models in a pure state in this 
or that author or text; they always intertwine and overlap. Nonetheless, these 
models are effective in showing the underlying difference between, for example, 
Husserl’s position in Cartesian Meditations, according to which primordially 
reduced consciousness constitutes another consciousness only after meeting a Leib 
similar to its own (the a posteriori model), and Heidegger’s idea of the ‘always 
already being-with others’ of Dasein (the a priori model). While a position such 
as Levinas,’ which is founded on the radical solitude of the hypostasis, is located 
on the same a posteriori side as is Husserl’s (to which, incidentally, it clearly owes 
a great deal), it is clear that Scheler’s position, founded on an a priori opening 
guaranteed by “sympathy,” clearly lies on the opposite side (and it is no 
coincidence that it inspired Heidegger’s position). 
                                                
2 See, for example: Olivier Ducharme, Michel Henry et le problème de la communauté. Pour une 
communauté d’habitus (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013); Grégori Jean, “De l’expérience métaphysique 
d’autrui à l’intersubjectivité en première personne,” Revue Internationale Michel Henry 2 (2011): 
16-70; Eric Rohde, “Le Soi au pluriel: entre répétition et rencontre,” Revue Internationale Michel 
Henry 2 (2011): 197-206; Graciela Fainstein Lamuedra, “Alteridad, intersubjetividad y comunidad 
en la vida en el pensamiento de Michel Henry,” Investigaciones fenomenológicas 3 (2011): 175-92; 
Claudio Tarditi, “Figures de l'intersubjectivité. Michel Henry critique des Méditations cartésiennes 
de Husserl,” Dialegesthai. Rivista telematica di filosofia 13 (2011), accessed January 27, 2015 
(http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/cta04.htm). 
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The identification of the a priori-a posteriori pair, as the marker of a 
fundamental polarity in the phenomenological manner of conceptualizing the 
problem of inter-subjectivity, cannot be taken for granted. Traditionally, in fact, 
the problem has been posed in terms of a different conceptual structuring pair, that 
of ‘mediate-immediate.’ On the basis of this pair, the problem can be formulated 
as follows: in an encounter with others (autrui), are they manifest to me 
immediately as such, or does something else (my ego, the other person’s body, a 
useable or sign of some kind) inevitably mediate, with the result that the event 
occurs in an, as it were, derivative way? 
Henry himself, for example, posed the issue in exactly these terms in one 
of his preparatory notes3 to the course he taught in 1953-54 in Aix-en-Provence 
regarding “The Communication between Consciousnesses and the Relation with 
the Other.”4 As a matter of fact, this note is all the more significant in that it sought 
to explicate the overall structural frame of Henry’s analysis: 
The experience of the other. The schema of my analysis of the experience 
of the other is the following: 1/ A critique of analogical reasoning and of Hegel, 
Sartre, Scheler. (+ The classic theory: pantheism, sympathy, etc.) 2/ A direct 
experience of the other is given.5 
After having baptized the problem of inter-subjectivity with an 
expression–‘the experience of the other’ (experience d’autrui)–that functions as a 
common thread throughout the entire evolution of his thought, Henry laid the 
foundations for a two-stage trajectory. The first, pars destruens—which consists 
in criticizing analogical reasoning, a manner of thinking that is mediated 
structurally by what functions as analogatum—was followed by the formulation 
of his own thesis. The specificity of the latter consisted in asserting the ‘direct,’ 
unmediated character of the way we experience others, and in showing how it is 
phenomenologically possible to account for such immediacy. 
It is clear that the immediate-mediate and a priori-a posteriori pairs are 
not entirely heterogeneous. They rather lend themselves to superimposition, to the 
extent that the mediated tends to coincide with the a posteriori and the immediate 
with the a priori. Nonetheless, it is more productive to keep them separate and to 
reformulate accordingly the traditional manner of framing the problem, primarily 
in order to avoid any rush to support one of the key assumptions of this traditional 
framing, namely the idea that access to ‘an immediate and direct experience of the 
                                                
3 Michel Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” ed. Grégori Jean, Revue Internationale Michel 
Henry 2 (2011): 71-138. The Editor has assembled materials collected by Henry in “L’expérience 
d’autrui” with thematically related notes discovered in the working notes to L’essence de la 
manifestation. On this monographic issue, see Jean, “De l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui à 
l’intersubjectivité en première personne,” 18-19. 
4 “La communication des consciences et les relations avec autrui” (See Henry, “Notes sur 
l’expérience d’autrui,” 139-72). 
5 “Expérience d’autrui. Le schéma de mon analyse de l’expérience d’autrui est le suivant: 1/ Critique 
du raisonnement par analogie et de Hegel, Sartre, Scheler. (+ théorie classique: panthéisme, 
sympathie, etc.) 2/ Il y a une expérience directe d’autrui” (Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 
71). See also Jean, “De l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui à l’intersubjectivité en première 
personne,” 23. 
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other’ (experience immediate et directe d’autrui) is truly a phenomenological 
ideal, to be pursued at all costs. This assumption, as we have just seen, also guides 
Henry’s initial formulation of the issue. Framing the problem in terms of an a 
priori-a posteriori access to inter-subjectivity at least has the advantage of being 
more neutral than the first pair in terms of evaluation, and of highlighting, for 
example, the fact that a thinker like Levinas, who focused his enquiry on inter-
subjectivity, radically rejected the a priori position which at first glance appeared 
to be the most promising. 
At this point it is finally possible to formulate precisely the thesis that I 
seek to argue here: in his attempt to develop a phenomenologically satisfactory 
solution to the problem of inter-subjectivity, Michel Henry no doubt adopted an a 
priori model; this approach led him to propose what is essentially a variation on 
Heidegger’s position, despite all of the criticisms, some of which were extremely 
harsh, that he directed at this latter position. In short, it is not a coincidence that 
the notion of ‘pathos-avec’ so closely resembles Heidegger’s idea of ‘Mitsein’—
‘être-avec’ in French. Beyond all the superficial criticisms, there is a deep and 
unintended solidarity that exposes Henry’s position to all the difficulties of the a 
priori model in general and of that of Heidegger in particular. 
Generally speaking, in Henry’s conceptual framework, the problem of 
inter-subjectivity appears immediately, already in the notes he wrote in his youth, 
in more or less the following terms (that themselves remain substantially the same): 
in order to be truly of an other (autrui) and not of a fictional surrogate, the 
experience of the other must be the experience of the other person’s feelings, 
pathos, ipseity. This is alive and pathic, just like mine. Otherwise, it would not 
truly be an experience of the other, but rather a pseudo-experience made up of 
unreal, noematic and transcendent content. What is more, it is not even enough to 
access another person’s lived experience, because the crucial point is that this 
Erlebnis or lived experience must be experienced in the absolutely specific, 
individual way that the other person experienced it. In asserting this radicalization 
of similar positions (primarily that of Scheler, from which the example was taken), 
Henry argues that is not enough to grasp the shame on the face of the other person 
in order to declare the problem of inter-subjectivity resolved. The problem is not 
the other person’s shame, it is the way the other experiences it, his or her manner 
of experiencing shame: “it is not the experience of that which is experienced by 
the other that is important, but rather the experience of the other [as] experiencing 
this or that thing.”6 With this, it is already clear where Henry’s trajectory will take 
him: indeed, it is clear that this experience is only possible if there is no gap (either 
temporal or logical) separating the other person’s experience and the way I 
experience the other person’s experience. 
Experience is genuinely an experience of the other only if (as Henry 
explicitly states at the end of Pathos-avec, thereby distilling the conclusion of this 
                                                
6 Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 87: “Ce qui compte n’est pas du tout l’expérience de ce 
qu’éprouve l’autre mais l’expérience de l’autre éprouvant telle ou telle chose.” 
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essay), “community is an a priori.”7 Now, this statement—which, unsurprisingly, 
concludes a heated critical engagement with the Fifth of Husserl’s Meditations, the 
paradigm of a phenomenology judged to be incapable of achieving this very a 
priori dimension of inter-subjectivity—inevitably sets the stage for an engagement 
with the equally paradigmatic view representing the opposite position, that of 
Heidegger. Indeed, this comparison arrives in § 47 of Incarnation, a section that 
also represents Henry’s most extensive discussion of inter-subjectivity as a mature 
thinker. 
It is clearly impossible to retrace the entirety of the lengthy path that would 
enable us to grasp fully the function that this section, entitled “The Experience of 
the Other in a Phenomenology of Life” (L’expérience d’autrui dans une 
phénoménologie de la vie), plays in the overall work. It will suffice to note that 
Henry uses this section to engage once more the issue that he had addressed already 
at the level of the phenomenology of the flesh—in relation to which, in that 
context, he had reached a dead end before then re-engaging the issue, and this time 
resolving it, on the level of the phenomenology of incarnation. Henry employs the 
customary strategy of identifying the non-explicit assumption due to which 
phenomenology until that point had been unable to develop an adequate solution 
to the problem of inter-subjectivity. After quickly recalling the limits of Husserl’s 
approach—specifically, its unjustifiable privileging of intentionality, such that the 
inability to account for other people’s experiences is nothing more than the 
epiphenomenon of a deeper failure to account for the transcendental life of 
consciousness—Henry goes on to analyze Heidegger’s position, focusing 
primarily on Chapter IV of Sein und Zeit. 
At first glance, everything would seem to disprove the hypothesis that 
Henry is in solidarity with Heidegger’s approach. From the beginning to the end 
of the section, Henry takes care to put as much distance as possible between his 
position and that of Heidegger. Indeed, the way the latter is presented casts it as an 
internal variation on Husserl’s model, equally unable to offer a satisfactory 
solution to the risk of solipsism. According to Henry, while criticizing the fact that 
intentionality is rooted in consciousness, Heidegger reasons on the basis of the 
same ecstatic background typical of Husserl’s phenomenology: while Dasein is 
certainly not transcendental consciousness, yet it radicalizes the very aspiration 
that comprises intentionality, by structuring itself as pure and simple openness to 
externality: “by eradicating definitively every form of ‘interiority,’ Heidegger’s 
Dasein, which is no more than ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein), furnishes 
a long-sought solution to the problem of the experience of the other.”8 Of course, 
in Henry’s perspective, this highly sought-after solution is only an illusion. 
                                                
7 See Henry, “Pathos-with,” in Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), 131 [Henry, “Pathos-avec,” in Phénoménologie matérielle (Paris: PUF, 
1990), 175]. 
8 Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston/Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 239 [Henry, Incarnation. Une philosophie de la chair (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 
342]. 
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However, before proceeding to his criticism, Henry is careful to convey 
Heidegger’s position as accurately as possible: 
Da-sein (the fact of being-there) is by itself a ‘being-with,’ and in this way 
a being-there with others. Dasein is not a ‘being-with’ because, opening us to the 
world, it opens us to others along with everything that shows itself in the world, in 
the same immediacy, without there being any need to leave any individual sphere 
in which we would be initially enclosed. It is not because, in fact, we are with 
someone in the world, or with many, that we are this ‘being-with.’ Whether we are 
alone or with others, ‘being-with’ always precedes. Solitude, for example, is 
possible only on the foundation of this ‘being-with,’ and as a privative modality of 
it.9 
As this lengthy quotation shows, Henry is perfectly successful in capturing 
the essence and ultimate aim of Heidegger’s attempt; that Mit-sein “always 
precedes” (précède toujours…) means precisely that it is an a priori opening that 
does not depend in any way on the occurrence of a “de facto” event such as the 
presence or absence of a concrete other. Heidegger’s model is without doubt an a 
priori position. 
Henry’s first objection focuses on the macroscopic contradiction—a 
contradiction that Henry is not the first to notice—in the idea of basing the a priori 
character of Mit-sein on the act of engaging with inner-worldly, useful things. In 
this model, the inner-worldly useful thing is given the function of a fundamental 
mediator of that which, paradoxically, is labeled a priori. Indeed, as scholars have 
noted, in Sein und Zeit the other (autrui) is introduced as a term for referencing the 
ready-to-hand (Zuhanden). Henry cites Heidegger’s famous (and rather 
disappointing) examples: the other is the one from whom I bought this book I am 
reading; the owner of the field I walk through, or the boat I see moored. Regardless 
of the phenomenological poverty of this description, the real problem according to 
Henry is that this argument gives rise to what is in effect a vicious circle: how 
might I engage with the ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) for what it is, if not on the basis 
of the preliminary opening of Mit-sein? The only possible conclusion is that; 
“Heidegger’s explanation turns in a circle. But it turns in a circle only because it is 
incapable of grasping ‘being-with’ while legitimating in some way the meaning it 
gives it.”10 As long as readiness-to-hand continues to play a decisive role, Mit-sein 
cannot be grasped at the level of its origin: indeed, the world’s ecstatic horizon 
continues to constitute the real premise of the encounter. It therefore remains 
wholly external to the immanence of life, at which level it should properly be 
situated. For this reason, Mit-sein in its unreality cannot truly account for its own 
‘content,’ that is, the real and concrete other that is, actually, mysteriously absent 
from Heidegger's description: 
If “being-with” must mean a “being-with-the-other,” one cannot pull this 
out of a hat.… “Being-with” as an opening to the world never explains anything 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 240 [343]. 
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about its content or about this relational, instrumental system that is supposed to 
show itself in it.11 
From Henry’s point of view, which is directed from the beginning at the 
most fragile element of Heidegger’s analysis, the dead end is revealed finally in 
the absence of any interaction between the notion of Mit-sein and the notion that 
expresses the decisive trait of Dasein, which is capable of granting substance and 
reality to what would otherwise remain simply an abstract concept; its “mineness” 
(Jemeinigkeit). It is only on the basis of this radical discovery, that always 
attributes Dasein to itself by making it an ipseity (i.e., a totally singular Self that 
cannot be reduced to any other) that an encounter with an other Self—as radically 
individual, as radically real and concrete, as an ipseity—makes sense. Of course, 
pushing the idea of Jemeinigkeit to its furthest limits “presupposes an original 
Ipseity, an ‘experiencing undergoing itself’ in which every conceivable Self [Soi] 
consists.”12 However, in making this observation we have already left behind 
Heidegger’s theoretical domain; as a matter of fact, Henry’s idea is that only by 
replacing the world’s ecstatic appearance with the manifestation of life to itself is 
it possible to consider “mineness” in depth, and therefore to frame the problem of 
sharing pathos, in which this ipseity is given to itself, on the correct conceptual 
terrain. Only in this way do “all the aporias of classical thought or contemporary 
phenomenology then dissipate.”13 
One might wonder if the dissolution of aporias, which is certainly one of 
the imperatives of ‘classical’ thought, should be taken for granted as a legitimate 
objective of phenomenology. The latter, in its mandate to adhere to what is given, 
should perhaps welcome rather than dissolve that which presents an aporetic trait. 
But let us leave this question open for now. For the moment, the important point 
is that Henry believes that the inter-subjective problem addressed by Husserl, 
Heidegger and all intentional phenomenology is resolved by abandoning the idea 
that it is necessary to begin from the finiteness of a Self in order to achieve a 
relationship with another Self: 
 
…still less should one move from an I [moi] or ego conceived as the point 
of departure, the source point of intentionality…. Every relation from one 
Self to another Self requires as its point of departure not this Self itself, an 
I [moi]—my own or the other’s—but their common transcendental 
possibility, which is nothing other than the possibility of their relation 
itself: absolute Life.14 
 
Anyone with even a minimal familiarity with Henry’s thought will be 
unsurprised: this step toward absolute life had been in the works for quite some 
time, in order that the problem of inter-subjectivity be dissolved. It is much less 
obvious that one can ‘speak’ this solution using Heidegger’s vocabulary, in 
                                                
11 Ibid., 241 [344]. 
12 Ibid. [345]. 
13 Ibid., 242 [345]. 
14 Ibid., 243 [347]. 
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opposition to which the solution was developed. The passage cited above proceeds 
as follows: “In the experience of the other, it is indeed a question of recognizing 
its inescapable precondition, ‘being-with’ as such, in its radical phenomenological 
possibility.”15 Again later: “in as much as they are living in one and the same Life, 
and are Selves in the Ipseity of one and the same Self, they are and can be each 
with the other in the ‘being-with’ that always precedes them.”16 What is striking is 
not only Henry’s emphasis on the ‘being-with’ (être-avec), but his literal repetition 
of the very characteristic that he himself had highlighted as a key objective of 
Heidegger’s analysis: the fact that this ‘being-with’ is truly such if it “always 
precedes” (precede toujours…)—that is, if it excludes any form of radical solitude 
from the very beginning. 
Henry had long accepted and supported the idea (exquisitely characteristic 
of Heidegger) that solitude is a derivative modification of ‘being-with.’ Indeed, in 
Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui he wrote: 
Is [solitude] an ontological determination, absolutely appropriate, 
insurmountable and unsurpassable, or is it only an existentiell determination? In 
Heidegger it seems to be, at first glance, a simply existentiell determination; but, 
actually, since it is based on a ‘being-possible’ which is ontologically defined 
(‘being-toward-death’ is an existential), it is an ontological determination.17 
In another note, Henry asserts the “apodictic evidence” of the refutation of 
solipsism, and explains that “solitude is less a privation of others than the privation 
of a mode of inner transcendental experience. One who suffers does not suffer for 
another’s absence. He suffers because of the absence of his experience of the 
other.”18 In other words: if solitude is not truly the absence of others but is the 
absence of my experience of the other, this means that the ‘being-with’ structurally 
inherent in ipseity, already more open to others, is not in the least affected by a 
merely contingent possibility, itself wholly contained within that which was 
defined as an “ontological” (ontologique) rather than an “existentiell” 
(existentielle) determination. 
From this point of view, it can be argued that Henry’s main goal is not so 
much to distance himself from Heidegger’s position, but rather to correct 
Heidegger using Heidegger’s own approach, by asserting that Heidegger fails to 
conceptualize, and to hold fast to, the theoretical model he adopted, namely, a 
priori inter-subjectivity. As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s analysis of ‘being-with’ 
(Mitsein) conducts an ontological-existential reworking of what Scheler had called 
“Robinson’s experiment.” Radicalizing the situation Defoe described in his 
                                                
15 Ibid. [347]. 
16 Ibid. [348]. 
17 Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 104: “Est-elle [i.e., la solitude] une détermination 
ontologique, absolument propre, insurmontable et indépassable, ou seulement une détermination 
existentielle? Chez Heidegger elle semble n’être à première vue qu’une détermination existentielle, 
mais en fait, comme elle repose sur un pouvoir-être ontologiquement défini (être-pour-la-mort est un 
existential), c’est une détermination ontologique.” 
18 Ibid.: “La solitude est moins la privation d’autrui que la privation de ce mode de l’expérience 
interne transcendantale. Celui qui souffre ne souffre pas [de l’absence] d’autrui. Il souffre de 
l’absence de son expérience d’autrui.” 
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famous novel, Scheler wondered if a radically solitary individual, alone not simply 
because he was shipwrecked on a desert island but because he had never enjoyed 
any true inter-subjective experiences, would be totally unaware of the possibility 
of other people or if, instead, he would have “the a priori proof of the existence of 
some ‘you’ in general.”19 Without going into the details of this rather intricate 
issue, it should suffice to underline that Scheler’s response is obviously yes, and 
that this response is the theoretical antecedent of Heidegger’s assertions in Sein 
und Zeit that the ‘being-with’ of the Dasein is radically independent of the presence 
or absence of another actual person.20 However, what is most important to note is 
that this is obviously the same theoretical trajectory that Henry followed, in 
relation to which he denounces Heidegger’s inadequacy: essentially, all Henry 
does is expose Heidegger’s unfaithfulness to himself, while at the same time 
proposing his own solution as a solution capable of perform the functions that the 
existential analytic set out to perform but proved incapable of completing. This 
strategy, simultaneously hermeneutical and theoretical, is vulnerable to two 
fundamental objections. 
The first objection concerns Henry’s criticism of the disconnection 
between ‘being-with’ and the tangible substance to which ‘being-with’ should 
grant access—a criticism which, as I have said, is fully legitimate. It is, however, 
necessary to take note of the fact that this disconnection is actually consubstantial 
with the a priori model as such, which by its very nature inevitably ends up 
subordinating the tangibility and reality of the other to the opening or subjective 
horizon that makes the encounter possible. The problem appears quite clearly in 
Heidegger’s approach: the insistence on the contingent nature of solitude is 
reversed in the impossibility that the tangible other escape the clutch of the ‘being-
with’ of Dasein in any way. While the ready-to-hand can be broken, and thus 
interrupt daily dealings the world, and thus provoke surprise, the other never really 
ceases to be such, and thus never surprises. It is unnoticed to such an extent that it 
is difficult even to find a suitable name for it in the field of existential analytics: 
Mitdasein? Other Dasein? Simply ‘other’? What is certain is that ‘being-with,’ 
unlike ‘being-in-the world,’ is never seriously threatened or cast into doubt by the 
possible absence (always de facto and always contingent) of this or that individual 
other. The price that must be paid in order to obtain the a priori certainty of ‘being-
with’ and the a priori refutation of solipsism is exactly the problem Henry would 
highlight—and this is indeed a rather high price, given that it concerns the 
irrelevance of the other. In this regard, it is significant that in the period of the 
Notes, Henry was open to a possible doubt. Specifically, this doubt concerned 
Heidegger, but in reality it also concerned any a priori model and attempt to offer 
a comprehensive and final solution to the problem of inter-subjectivity (and 
therefore also the solution he himself went on to propose): “The problem [is] well-
resolved, and in fact too much so. If everything is patent, how would anxiety before 
                                                
19 Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, in GW VIII, ed. Manfred S. Frings 
(Berlin/München: Francke, 1973), 230-1. 
20 For a more extended analysis of this issue see Stefano Bancalari, L’altro e l’esserci. Heidegger e 
il problema del ‘Mitsein’ (Padova, Cedam: 1999). 
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the other originate: anxiety between lovers; what are you thinking of?”21 This 
question, which goes straight to the very heart of the issue of inter-subjectivity, 
reveals the uneasiness lurking beneath the explicit solutions that Henry proposed. 
It reveals a possible refutation of the a priori model that yet never developed into 
the real elaboration of an alternative model. 
The second objection derives, one might say, from the application of the 
principle of charity. Despite the fact that Heidegger repeatedly asserted the a-
priority of ‘being-with’ (Mit-sein) with regard to the world’s opening, it is quite 
unlikely that Heidegger’s position as a whole fails to go beyond the contradiction 
Henry identified. Therefore, he asserts the need for a mediation of the ready-to-
hand in order to ensure the appearance of the other. Indeed, things are not quite so: 
in this respect Henry fell victim to an almost standard reading, actually a partial 
reading, of the fourth chapter of Sein und Zeit. This fails to take into account the 
stringent internal logic of Heidegger’s argument, which, from the beginning of the 
first (§25) to the end of the last (§27) of the three sections comprising the chapter, 
is aimed at demonstrating precisely the a priori character of ‘being-with’ (Mit-
sein). I will illustrate this point below; on the basis of what has emerged thus far, 
it is immediately clear that Henry’s reading is not simply partial or ungenerous. 
The point is that detecting the coherence of the logic within Heidegger’s discourse 
inevitably involves bringing to light the problematic nature of the a priori model 
as such, an issue faced by anyone who decides to adopt this model, including both 
Heidegger and Henry, who never openly criticized it and indeed who explicitly re-
asserts its underlying assumption. 
The ultimate aim of Heidegger’s argument is clearly stated from the very 
beginning. In § 25, at the very moment in which he outlines the issue he proposes 
to resolve through his analysis of Mitsein, Heidegger foreshadows the solution, 
which involves calling into question the obviousness of the starting point of the 
analysis: “It could be the case that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein just is not the ‘I 
myself.’”22 That which only appears as a hypothesis in the initial phase is revealed 
at the end to be the long sought-after solution. As scholars have noted, the Who of 
everyday Dasein is precisely this ‘not,’ the ‘no one’ who dominates the daily play 
of inter-subjective and social relations; in other words, the ‘They’ (das Man). From 
the very beginning, all of Heidegger’s descriptions are aimed at this outcome and 
designed to demonstrate that Dasein is always already with others (precisely 
because it is always already inhabited by the ‘They’). And yet, it must be added, 
this is the most coherent outcome of any a priori model, including Henry’s. 
At first glance it may seem completely inappropriate to bring Henry’s 
‘Life’ in relation with Heidegger’s ‘They’ (das Man), if only because the former 
is expressly defined as absolute ipseity, whereas the ‘They’ is exactly the opposite; 
                                                
21 Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 154: “Problème très bien résolu, trop bien; si tout est 
patent, d’où vient [l’] inquiétude devant l’autre ; inquiétude des amants : à quoi penses-tu?” 
22 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), 150 [Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, in GA II, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann 
(Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1977), 115: “Es könnte sein, daß das Wer des alltäglichen Daseins 
gerade nicht je ich selbst sein.”—Trans.] 
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it is the negation of every self and every ipseity. This is certainly true, but it is quite 
derivative of the manner in which these two concepts, Life and They, are presented 
as solutions to the problem of inter-subjectivity. It is also derivative of the 
structural similarity of the problems that these alleged solutions encounter. 
Let us first consider the methodological move that, in the context of both 
Henry’s radical phenomenology and Heidegger’s existential analytic, makes it 
phenomenologically possible to legitimize the a-priority of any opening to the 
other. This move involves taking a step backward in terms of the point of view (in 
the sense outlined above) that is assigned to a ‘before’ in relation to the Self. 
Whether this is a matter of discovering the ‘They’ (das Man) as the ‘real’ actor of 
everyday life or shifting from one’s own Self to the ‘absolute Life’ (Vie absolue) 
as a “common transcendental possibility” (commune possibilité transcendantale) 
of all Selves,23 from a methodological point of view the process is the same. 
Heidegger's assertion that “it could be the case that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein 
is just not ‘I myself’” echoes Henry’s argument that we must not begin “from an I 
[moi] or an ego conceived as the point of departure, the source point of 
intentionality.”24 In both cases the issue is to determine the relative 
phenomenological legitimacy of this move. Given that it is impossible to avoid a 
point of view, or a “source point of intentionality,” in which the phenomenological 
gaze is located, doesn’t the possibility of transferring this point of view from the 
Self to elsewhere in relation to the Self (the ‘Life’ or the ‘They’) presuppose 
exactly what should instead be established—that is, the relationship between this 
point of view and another point of view? In other words, we risk illegitimately 
claiming the right and privilege to speak on behalf of ‘Life’ or of the ‘They,’ 
assuming what phenomenology teaches us from the start to view as the greatest 
mistake of pre-phenomenological thought, that is, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, 
“pensée de survol.” Once again it is interesting to note how the young Henry 
denounces precisely this risk in Heidegger’s use of the notion of ‘Being:’ “The 
truth of Being, which ensures that I see that x is in front of me, as this table is in 
front of me, plays in Heidegger the same role [le même rôle de survol] as does the 
‘abstract understanding’ in Hegel’s Spirit.”25 It is not clear, however, why the exact 
same observation should not apply to ‘Life,’ attributing to it “le même rôle de 
survol.” 
It should be noted that, when the heuristic concept of a ‘point of view,’ as 
discussed above in our introduction, is installed (legitimately or otherwise) in the 
position of an “absolute,” the problem of inter-subjectivity cannot be considered 
resolved. The denunciation of the absolute character of manifestation simply 
serves to make explicit the conditions due to which this problem was posited in the 
first place. As Husserl’s analyses demonstrate ad abundantiam, the 
phenomenological issue of inter-subjectivity certainly does not concern the 
                                                
23 See Henry, Incarnation, 243 [347]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 92: “La vérité de l’être qui fait que je vois que x est 
devant moi comme je vois que cette table est devant moi revient ainsi à jouer chez Heidegger le 
même rôle de survol que l’Esprit de Hegel.” 
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empirical description of the relations among other empirical egos. Rather, it only 
arises when trying to understand how to juxtapose an absolute—in this case, that 
of transcendental consciousness—with another absolute, that is, another 
consciousness that is also transcendental. So, in Henry’s terminology, the real 
problem would be to understand whether and how, absolute Life can open to 
another life that is likewise absolute. Given that this is nonsense in Henry’s terms, 
the very problem of inter-subjectivity is all but dissolved: not because it is resolved 
but because it is expunged from the outset and on principle from the theoretical 
framework in use. In fact, this is exactly Henry’s position. To remain truly faithful 
to a concept of absoluteness—according to which “the reality of feeling is the 
reality of the absolute,”26—implies an obligation to conclude that “every possible 
being in common… is always first and foremost carried out as an immediate 
modification of absolute subjectivity.”27 This subjectivity, as a result of its absolute 
nature, naturally remains singular, exactly as Heidegger’s ‘They’ (Man) is 
structurally singular. 
In this theoretical situation we can identify the common thread of the 
(actually rather narrow) range of concrete types of communities that Henry 
considers in Pathos-avec: that between the hypnotist and hypnotized, between a 
mother and her child, and between the self and the dead who inhabit therein. 
Indeed, these types are united by the fact that they do not involve “the emergence 
of an I as an I or an other as an other.”28 It would be hard to find a more relevant 
definition of Heidegger’s conceptualization of the ‘They’ (Man). On closer 
examination, the idea underlying both Henry’s pathic community (communauté 
pathétique) and Heidegger’s ‘They’ (Man) is “fusion” (which can be seen 
explicitly in Incarnation)29. This is no coincidence, because the source common to 
both is Scheler’s idea of unipathy (Einsfühlung), an idea upon which both authors 
draw even while criticizing it—because this conclusion is structurally connected 
to the adoption of the a priori model. 
Given this, it seems to me that Henry’s approach occupies quite a clear 
position within the phenomenological debate on inter-subjectivity. It is equally 
clear that there is an underlying affinity between his position and that of Heidegger. 
This does not mean that there are no fluctuations. Some of these have been 
identified in the course of this article. These fluctuations, thoroughly and expertly 
outlined by the editor of the Notes30 in his aforementioned introductory essay, do 
                                                
26 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 628 
[Henry, L’essence de la manifestation (Paris: PUF, 1990), 788]. 
27 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 115 [155]. 
28 Ibid., 127 [171]. 
29 In this book, Henry defines authentic erotic experience as the “each living being’s desire to enter 
into symbiosis with the life of another living being and finally to be united with it in a loving vital 
fusion.” [Henry, Incarnation, 311: “désir de chaque vivant d’entrer en symbiose avec la vie d’un 
autre vivant et finalement de s’unir à lui dans la fusion vitale amoureuse.”—Trans.] The notion of 
“fusion” may generate several problems within the domain of the philosophy of religion, as was 
argued by Jean Greisch, Du ‘non-autre’ au ‘tout autre’ (Paris: PUF, 2012), 36. 
30 See Jean, “De l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui à l’intersubjectivité en première personne,” 32-
3. 
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not seem related to some internal evolution in Henry’s thought, however. Rather, 
they signal an unfulfilled possibility, the invitation to think about how the problem 
of inter-subjectivity would arise if Henry had not taken a step backward in the face 
of the radical solitude of feeling, declaring that it was always already—in an a 
priori manner—resolved in the pathos-avec. 
This solitude already emerges in the disturbing question raised in the Notes 
(“what are you thinking of?”)31 and bursts forth in, for example, the beautiful pages 
of Incarnation on the night of lovers. Here the “phenomenology of the sexual act” 
unfolds through descriptions which, proceeding without any concern that they 
might end up in a dead end, appear far more phenomenologically powerful than 
the descriptions of hypnotic community: “The impotence of each to attain the other 
in itself exasperates the tension of desire up to its resolution in the paroxysmal 
feeling of orgasm, in such a way that each has its own without being able to feel 
that of the other as the other feels it.”32 The hypothesis that remains to be explored 
is whether this dead-end might actually conceal Henry’s most fruitful contribution 
(perhaps even the one most characteristic of his thinking), to the issue of inter-
subjectivity, and whether the importance of this contribution can only emerge 
within the framework of an a posteriori model. 
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31 See note 21, above, and also Henry, “Notes sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 154. 
32 Henry, Incarnation, 211 [302]. 
